Further, being originally pertinent to the ethical domain, as to be shown through a phenomenological subtlety, this fundamental crisis brings up the problem of values as the core of ethics. This, in turn, suggests the essential demand for constructing a value theory in order to overcome the crisis. Here my argumentation on this claim will be performed in four steps: First, in order to prepare a proper definition for the so-called "modern crisis of culture", I will take a phenomenological approach towards the phenomenon of culture to show its deep and inherent connection to the sphere of ethics, employing Husserl's account and definition of the phenomenon in question. Then I will offer a critical analysis of the word "crisis", employing its etymological history in order to characterize the particular sense in which one may talk of the modern crisis of culture. In the third step, I will briefly discuss the issue of how the "crisis of culture" results from the love-reason separation in Ancient Greek philosophy. And my final argument will be devoted to answer the question of how and in what sense there could be a possibility for surpassing the crisis, which then can clear the ground for an authentic phenomenology of religion. I will employ some of Max Scheler and Kierkegaard's insights in these two last steps.
A. What is the Phenomenon of "Culture" in General?
In order to be able to talk about the crisis of culture and its contextual grounds, we should first critically ask if there exists in fact such a crisis at all. This question, however, demands the preceding clarification of what is generally meant by the "crisis of culture", as it has emerged in the history of modern philosophy, especially in the language of twentieth century philosophers. This crisis was cognized particularly well in the phenomenological movement started by contemporary German philosopher, Edmund Husserl, and his philosophical concerns about the crisis of humanity, and specifically "European" humanity.
Here there are two phenomena to be clarified: "crisis" and "culture". As mentioned before, I will start with the phenomenon of culture to which the crisis refers. Now, due to his accuracy as well as his phenomenological approach, which is my elected approach in this paper, I would prefer to employ Husserl's definition of culture, as offered in his Kaizo articles 2 .
Further, this "ethical domain" itself should be considered in an "absolute" and "unique" sense of the word "ethical", which means that it should not be understood as a counterpart of different aspects of what is commonly understood as human culture such as art, religion, politics and intellectual achievement 6 . But rather it dominates all aspects of human life and manages all these "continuing activities of communal life" 7 in a coherent and unifying way. Husserl asserts: "throughout all the types of acts of consciousness there runs a normative consciousness interwoven with them"
8 . This normative consciousness is just like a conductor of an orchestra, whose direction results in a lilting harmonious tune produced by the band of all these different dimensions of one whole called a "tradition". In this sense, culture is the "normal ethos" of a human community, ruling it towards "the best possible" way of life in its particular "homeland" 9 .
Secondly, as the usage of the phrase "developing cultural forms" in the aforesaid definition suggests, culture is not something stable or pre-given which is practiced in a static way by the subsequent generations of a given community. But rather it should be understood as a kind of dynamic process in which, through the "continuing activities" of the members of a community, some possible themes among others are intended, chosen, appropriated and finally formulated as specific "cultural forms" of that given community. This whole process of intending, choosing and appropriating, however, is based upon "a unifying norm" as the "normal ethos" or "tradition" of that community, which "itself is alive in the social consciousness, [and] is itself progressively and historically shaped and objectivated as culture"
10 .
This dynamic description of the phenomenon of culture is totally grounded on Husserl's genetic phenomenology upon which his concern is no longer just what the essence of human community and its culture is. But rather and further, how this essence can be understood only through "development [and] Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge(1922 -1937 , 59, translated and quoted in Welton, The Other Husserl, 309. 9 . See Seinbock, "Ethical Renewal and Critique,"449-452. 10 . Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge(1922 -1937 , 63, translated and quoted in Welton, The Other Husserl, 309. 11 . Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922 -1937 , 44, translated and quoted in Welton, The Other Husserl, 314. It is in this sense that in his Kaizo articles, he talks about "the genesis of renewal" of the European culture and calls for "the attempt to develop genetically the ethical form of life as an a priori and essential formation of possible human life" 12 , since for him, "the idea of true humanity and its method of giving shape to itself is such only in the process of becoming" 13 .
B. A Brief Etymological History of the Word "Crisis"
Tracing back to the Greek word "krisis" (κρίσις) which is derived from the verbal stem "krino" (κρινῶ) or "krinein" (κρίνειν), denoting 1) to separate; 2) to decide; and 3) to judge, the name "crisis" may mean: 1) separation; 2) decision; and 3) judgment 14 , which all may be combined in a "crucial stage" or a "turning point" in the course of an incident. This crucial stage inevitably demands a kind of instability, at which the trend of future events in regards to that particular incident, for better or for worse, is determined through a firm final decision, preceded by a kind of judgment.
This definition is in fact, a generalization of the particular medical use of the term "crisis" in Ancient Greek (used as such by Hippocrates and Galen) for "turning point of a disease", or the crucial and decisive moment in the unstable course of a disease, at which the patient has been divided between life and death, and according to his general fettle which can be judged by his physician, one end of the dichotomy is finally decided 15 .As can be seen in this definition, there are several existential senses such as danger, anxiety, difficulty, conflict, chaos in routine, risk, necessity, demand of going further, which is impossible without making a decision beforehand, and finally a so-called Hobson's choice 16 , so to speak, are all experienced once and at the same time in the stage of crisis.
12 . Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922 -1937 , 29, translated and quoted in Welton, The Other Husserl, 314. 13 . Husserl, Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922 -1937 44-46. 16 . A Hobson's choice is a free choice in which only one option is offered. As a person may refuse to take that option, the choice is therefore between taking the option or not; "Take it or leave it". The phrase is said to originate with Thomas Hobson (1544-1631), a livery stable owner in Cambridge, England. To rotate the use of his horses, he offered customers the choice of either taking the horse in the stall nearest the door or taking none at all. "Wikipedia," last modified on 5 April 2014, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hobson%27s_choice
However, despite the fact that all these senses are so intimately bound together and intertwined with one another in one crucial stage, a phenomenological subtlety can recognize some sort of primacy and sequence among them within the unity of this multilayered phenomenon. In accord with those meanings implied in the aforesaid etymological definition, it seems that there can be distinguished four sequential steps in the crisis, as emerges in the following analysis:
At the stage of crisis, one is supposed to make a crucial decision, since one is stuck between two ways or two things to choose, apart from which he/she can go no further. At first glance, this conflict seems to be imposed on the person trapped in the critical situation from outside, but in a deeper sense based upon a phenomenological approach, this seemingly outward conflict points to its roots inside the person and reflects his/her existential feeling of a conflict between two aspects of his/her own being as a human which has been inevitably preceded by a kind of separation between different aspects of that sort of being, namely "human being". So as an articulation of the above analysis, until now, we have three stages one occurring after another: separation, conflict, decision.
What is demanded now is a criterion which serves as a judge and makes the decision possible. This determines another step in between conflict and decision, namely, judgment. So now the question turns to this criterion of judgment and its origins. It is crucial, however, to note that, regardless of whatever such criterion could be, since it is acting as a judge, this criterion is inevitably an evaluating factor, given the fact that there is no judgment without any evaluation which puts a set of values in order. On the other hand, since evaluation is the most essential characteristic of the sphere of ethics, we may conclude that this criterion eventually has its roots in the ethical domain, and so in this way shares a common ground with culture, which as we showed above, is basically an ethical phenomenon (in an absolute sense of the word "ethical"). This common root prepares the ground for considering "the modern crisis of culture" as something intrinsically ethicalin kind, as we will discuss it later in this paper.
But then again, functioning as a judge for making the decision possible, this criterion itself shall be considered as one of the steps of the whole course of the crisis and so as something which emerges within the course rather than merely intervening in it from outside. Interestingly enough, the word criterion itself shares the same etymological stem with the word crisis -i.e. the Greek word "krinein" in the sense mentioned before. This may suggest that the very criterion of judgment for solving a critical situation has its roots in a preceding separation and crisis, and so on and so forth. In this sense, one may also say that every evaluation, as the heart of any act of judgment, is in fact a sort of revaluation of the previous order of values which has been already shaken by a precedent separation and conflict and so has lost its inspiring and sensemaking role in the course of an ethico-cultural life of either an individual or a community.
This may lead to the conclusion that first, culture by its very essence is a critical phenomenon and second that indeed as a cultural being, humanity, is always and inherently in the status of crisis. This recalls Kierkegaard's conception of human condition as he asserts in his Sickness onto Death: "the human condition is always critical" 17 and that "There is no immediate state of spiritual health [in this condition]"
18 . This conception is based upon Kierkegaard's definition of human being as "a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity"
19 . In short, according to him, human being is a battle field of two opposite poles which are in an unceasing struggle in every stage of one's life. In this sense there is no starting point for the crisis, as it is an intrinsic component of human nature and so, as it were, is always there. But then what is the point of talking about such a thing as "the modern crisis of culture"? Apparently, it makes no sense any more. Nevertheless, there is indeed such a crisis as a historical fact, recognized and announced by contemporary philosophers, so that one might wonder what this crisis is all about.
In fact, one may say that Kierkegaard's definition of human being is fair enough to point to the dynamic structure of the human nature and its fundamental temporality, though it is still too formal to involve a sense of historicity as that essential human characteristic which makes the very phenomenon of culture and its constant movement possible. This, in turn, implies that only through bringing historicity into account could one ask of what is meant by the alleged "modern crisis of culture" and seeks for its roots and origins within the horizon of human historicity. Further, as constructed upon material categories a priori of human apprehension, historicity is that characteristic which is as essential for each human individual as for the entire community. In this sense, historicity is the most basic interface of individual and community through which they reflect into one another and have reciprocal influence on each other. As a consequence, one may say that, in human communities, every single person is as individual as universal, and this point should be especially considered once one is about to render a definition for human nature in general. This helps us understand how each individual is the representative of the entire history of its tradition and so is responsible for any purported crisis in that tradition, especially the most fundamental and universal one, namely the ethical crisis of culture. I will refer to this point in the last part of the current paper.
C: The Greek Love-Reason Separation as the Root of the Modern Crisis of Culture
Having assumed the necessity of bringing human historicity into account once our concern is the modern crisis of culture, our first question would be of the socalled historical "starting point" of the crisis at issue in the course of human history. Evidently this crisis is specific to the modern age, as its attribute indicates. This may suggest that it should be traced back to the starting point of the modern age itself in which something unprecedented has happened and led to this particular sort of crisis. This unprecedented occurrence, for Husserl, is the advent of "a new sense of rationality" which he calls "natural-scientific rationality" and characterizes it asthat mathematical method upon which, "the splitting of the world and the transformation of its meaning was quite unavoidable" 20 . Here emerges the first essential component of the crisis, namely separation, as a result of which "the world-in-itself split into nature-in-itself and a mode of being which exists psychically" 21 or the well-known "Cartesian mind-body dualism". This separation in turn was followed by "the specialization of the sciences" 22 and "the inner dissolution" of "the ideal of one universal science" 23 , namely philosophy, the main task of which was to provide the whole realm of human knowledge in all its branches with their foundation and meaning for human life. In part I of the Crisis, Husserl explains that the main ideal and "the innermost motivation" of the sum total of all the revolutionary efforts of the era of modernity from the very outset was to establish a new universal philosophy as the foundation of a new humanity. Nevertheless the actual results have been quite contrary to the predetermined target. The reason for this latter, according to him, is nothing but the "centuries-old failure" of the modern philosophers in grasping the true and genuine meaning of reason and rationality and so their inability to find the true method of inquiry for that "all-encompassing science, or the science of what is" (οντωςον)
. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
24 . As a consequence, modern rationalism turned out to be a "naïve", "mistaken", "absurd", "narrow-minded" and "bad" rationality. The rationality of "lazy reason" or, let us just say, it was rather a real "irrationalism" 25 which has lost the true meaning of rationality, in the original Greek sense of the word.
Having resulted in skepticism about the possibility of a universal philosophy (metaphysics), this rationalism has fallen short of the "whole problematics of reason" and been disappointed with encountering those so-called "ultimate and highest", "metaphysical" 26 questions of humanity, the most burning of which are the questions of "the meaning or the meaninglessness of the whole of the human existence" 27 . This is what Husserl considers the core of the modern crisis of culture which threatens "[the entire] European humanity in respect to the total meaningfulness of its cultural life"
28 . The most striking evidence for this modern irrationalism, as he regretfully announced, is the devastating World War which "has revealed the internal untruthfulness and senselessness of the modern culture".
29
So what is the resort, if this plight can be remedied at all? Husserl, in response, calls for the renewal of the European culture which, for him, is possible only through the revival of the "true idea of rationality". This in turn demands a new faith in "universal reason which is inborn in humanity as such" and so, in fact, a new faith of humanity in itself as a "rational being". Here Husserl refers back to the Greek sense of reason according to which reason is the criterion of "truth in itself". It is that fundamental principle "which ultimately gives meaning to everything that is thought to be, all things, values and ends," or in a word, to "what is"
30 . In this sense, reason is the "meaningful order of being" 31 in its entirety. That is why for the ancient Greeks reason is "the explicit theme" in all the disciplines concerning "knowledge", "valuation" and "ethical action". In all these, "reason is a title for 'absolute', 'eternal' and 'unconditionally' valid ideas and ideals" 32 .
This reason, according to Husserl, is what amounts to the "spiritual image of Europe" 33 , which was first established in the ancient Greek nation as its spiritual birthplace in the seventh and six centuries B.C. E. Hence among all other civilizations throughout the history, "Greek humanity" has the privilege of being "the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such", namely as "a rational being (animal rationale)" 34 . This is what makes European humanity of "supranational" According to all of the above, Husserl calls for regaining faith in "the creative power of reason" which can guarantee "an aesthetic and moral sense" 37 for the whole cultural life of European humanity. He articulates this decisive solution, which is in fact his only proposed solution to overcome the modern crisis of culture, in a famous sentence at the end of his Phenomenology and the crisis of European man; that is "in the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy, through a heroism of reason" 38 . Here, reason is hero since it is the criterion of truth, and as such a criterion, it can be a good judge in the critical situation. It is the foundation of the human capability for "reflection" (Besinnung) which in its deepest sense, consists in a conscious engagement in a subject matter in order to get to "the heart of it" or to "what it genuinely and essentially is", the function which is particularly assigned to "critique" and "criticism". 30 . Husserl, Crisis, [12] [13] Philosophy, 192. In this sense, the main characteristic of human reason is 'critique", a word which again shares the same Greek stem with the words crisis and criterion 39 . So one may say, through critique, reason is the judging criterion of truth in the status of crisis. What a conscious engagement or "a critical consideration" 40 -in Husserl's wordsimplies is the recognition of oneself in the course of a reflective analysis. This recognition enables the thinker to understand his relation to the subject matter of the analysis and his role and responsibility "to have it make sense" 41 .
This established sense is what signifies the essential nature of its subject and reveals its "truth". The whole course of critique, however, is accomplished only when the thinker can recognize his responsibility for his own truth or true being 42 as a "rational being" and can constitute his own norms and the meaning of his own existence according to this ideal of rationality. The latter occurs in the transition from a "purely theoretical attitude" to a "new kind of practical outlook" which demands "a universal critique of all life and of its goals". This, in turn, entails "the critique of mankind of itself and of those values that explicitly or implicitly guide it" 43 . Here the absolute theoretical insights of reason about the truth as such bring forth a new value order which is as absolute and objective as reason itself. It is through practicing the objective norms of this value order that human being can be "transformed into a radically new humanity" 44 or, in better words, it can arrive at the genuine sense of humanity: "the humanity of higher man" as a rational being and "of reason"as the criterion of truth 45 .
Yet, one might wonder about "the question of justification of reason itself", that is, about the criterion of the legitimacy of this very criterion of truth. We learned that critique is the essential characteristic of reason, but how can this characteristic assign reason to be the criterion of truth in itself? In addition, how can it characterize humanity, as such, as a rational being? 39 . SeeDodd, Crisis and Reflection, 46. 40 . Husserl, Crisis, 18. 41 . See Dodd, Crisis and Reflection, [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Husserl, Crisis, 17. 43 . Husserl, Crisis of Philosophy, 169. 44 . Ibid. 45 . Ibid., 180 162 International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2(3), September 2014 Can anyone be possibly right if he/she considers "reason" as "essentially but an invention of the Greeks"? 46 This latter is the explicit position that Max Scheler takes.
In fact, Husserl is not the only philosopher of our age who announced the privilege of ancient Greeks in "this orientation towards reason" 47 as a historical fact. His contemporary, Scheler, has also noticed this point, though from another perspective. In his Man andHistory, while describing various "basic types of man's conception of himself" and "his interpretation of his own nature" 48 , Scheler introduces "the idea of 'homo sapiens' [rational man]" as "one of the most powerful and influential discoveries of human self-judgment"
49 . But at the same time, he intentionally emphasizes on the initiation of this idea "by the Greeks and only by them and by no other human culture" 50 .
Scheler explains well how reason, for the ancient Greeks, turned out to be the only determinative principle by which humanity "will be capable of recognizing being in itself… the divinity, the world, and himself". The consequence of this latter would be the human being's capability of "forming nature meaningfully by his activity [and] of treating his fellow-man well so as to develop, as perfectly as possible, this specific agent of creative reason" 51 .
One may notice the striking similarity between Scheler and Husserl's description and terminology of the Greeks' conception of "reason" which, in some sense, lasted the whole history of western philosophy up to the modern times. Nevertheless, they sharply differ from one another in their approaches towards this historical fact, since while Husserl passionately invites the entire Europe to revive such a conception of reason, Sheler considers it as a mere "invention of the Greeks". That is why the former radically questioned the meaning and value of what we call "truth itself" 53 and the latter challenged the concept of reason as "the self-evident background and principle of the entire world order" 54 .
On the other hand, one may rightly say that, just like Husserl, Scheler's main philosophical concern is "the modern crisis of culture" and its destructive consequences for Europe. He likewise speaks of the War as the diagnosis of the disease of the European soul and so calls for the necessary demand for "The Reconstruction of European Culture" 55 . However, unlike Husserl, Scheler sees the origins of the crisis at issue, not in the lost meaning of reason, but to the contrary, alike his pagan counterpart, Nietzsche, in the so-called "reversal of values" 56 . For Scheler, this latter finds its roots in nothing less than a missing phenomenon which has been failed to be recognized as the foundation of reason and all rational activities from the very beginning of Greek philosophy. Here Scheler brings "Love" into the discussion. He has a well-grounded argumentation on the fact that it was "man's love for the world" and his "ever and insatiably thirsting for poetic reunion and sympathy with all aspects of world essence" 57 which first established the fountainhead for the advent of Greek philosophy, as its very title (namely "the love of knowledge") indicates. Accordingly it beseemed love, by right of its nature, to be placed first in the hierarchy of human knowledge of the sphere of being in general. Nevertheless from the very outset this principal role of love was unappreciated and its supremacy was ignored by the great progenitors of European philosophy.
According to Scheler, in the Greek notion of love, as it was articulated by Plato and Aristotle, "love is understood intellectually, as dependent on the process of knowledge" 58 . For them, love is considered as "the striving or willing of human intellect" which functions as "a bridge" or "an ontic agent" for "transition from a poorer and lesser to a greater and richer knowledge" 59 . For Scheler, this articulation is the entire reduction of love to knowledge 60 .
However, this latter, once upon a time in the history of the West, was radically opposed by the new conception of love unprecedentedly brought forward by Christianity. This new conception of love which Scheler calls "a reversal of (or in) themovement of love" 61 "invalidates the Greek axiom that love goes from lower to higher things" 62 and introduces an entirely inverted criterion of the phenomenon in question. Now according to this novel criterion not only is love no longer "the drive of the least to win participation in the most" 63 , or the never-fully-fulfilled desire of the finite for the infinite, but to the contrary, "it has its origin in the Infinite Being itself" 64 . It is the infinite "superabundance" or "overflow" 65 of the absolute Being over non-being, not "the striving of non-being for being" 66 through gaining knowledge. Consequently, it is no longer intellectual knowledge which is the criterion of truth and the value order of the world up to the highest good, since now "love itself is the highest of all goods" 67 and in being so, the true criterion of the entire sphere of values. Moreover, now the principle of eternity and perpetuation, as the received characteristic of love in terms of the principle of procreation for ancient Greeks, is well-grounded on the basis of the infinite Being. Upon this basis, it now can transcend its previous status of being a senselessly ever-repeated procreation of the finites as their yearning to be the infinite. Instead it represents an inward way towards infinity and a sign for an infinite aspect of the very being of humanity, which is founded on the infinite Being as the eternal origin of love itself.
